One of the responses to a previous post on here--the one showing that 30% of British Moslems support the Islamic State and bemoaning the British government's steadfast refusal to combat Moslem terrorism by, inter alia, calling it Moslem terrorism--observed that the Western governments' apparent impotence in the face of Islamic terrorism and extremism owes to their desire to not alienate the (probably? hopefully?) 70% of the Moslems who do not support the I.S. Even though support for the I.S. is just one measure of the nomos of the Moslem communities and societies worldwide--and other criteria yield far more depressing statistics, well exceeding a half of the Moslem populations--, that statement is essentially correct. The Western governments do not want to alienate the Moslems living in their countries who, even if they hold abhorrent views, do not actually go out bombing, raping, running over, and hacking up people. They also do not want to incense those who, while neither engaging in nor supporting such acts, are Moslem in name and do take pride in their Islamic heritage. That much is understandable and even commendable.
The problem, however, is that the Western governments are not doing much of anything. (And no, pretending and contending that terrorism is a bane upon everyone, that "far-Right" "extremism" is as much a danger as Moslem terrorism, and that the answer is more unity, more diversity, and more love does not count as doing something.) Essentially, those governments do not wish to alienate their Moslem communities--or the global Islamdom--but they are simultaneously bereft of any vision of how to approach the Moslems living in the West, which includes endeavoring to coopt them in the fight against terrorism.
The first step, surely, would be to acknowledge that terrorism is rooted in the Moslem community and, indeed, that it is rooted in the ideology to which the members of that community overwhelmingly subscribe. That does not need to be an indictment of the entire community or of Islam but there has to be a recognition that, sometimes, something goes wrong there and that it is largely that community's responsibility to ensure it does not. After all, Moslems generally have a propensity to both hold Westerners collectively accountable for our "foreign policy" as well as boast of their strong family ties that contrast favorably with the hedonistic individualism of the wretched infidels. It would surely not be too much to insist they took better care of their much more nuclear and close-knit communities.
How to encourage the Moslem communities to take point in battling the terrorism emanating from them is another matter. There is not much of a carrot to dangle in front of them. Despite the occasional howls of hysteria about "Islamophobia," Moslems in the West are not discriminated against in any palpable way. They have free and ready access to the same education and employment opportunities as anyone else. The stick approach would not be necessarily more desirable because it both would effectively criminalize and marginalize the entire Moslem community--and collective punishment is instinctively wrong to the modern Western psyche--and would necessitate immense resources to monitor millions of people scattered throughout a country.
The only realistic option left, then, is the proverbial if jaded "battle for the hearts and minds." The Moslems of the West must be persuaded of the virtues of the classical liberal worldview, including the rule of law, the separation of church and state, the equality of the sexes, the protection of minorities, the freedom of conscience, the freedom of expression, and so forth. That persuasion must be confident and resolute. The inevitable pushback--from segments of the Moslem communities as well as the inevitable Leftist professional activists screaming about "racism"--must be confuted unapologetically and with ever-renewed vigor. Naturally, doing so requires repudiation of the poisonous cultural relativism credo and rediscovery of pride in the Western classical liberal thought. The toxic self-flagellation by the Western society over the past half a century or so has resulted in a dispirited, mentally-feeble, morally-rudderless majority people. Such demoralized Westerners are no match for the more assertive and aggressive cultures.
The first step in answering how to foil the germination of terrorism in the Western Moslem communities is therefore to bolster the fundaments of the Western society. The second step is to essay to extend those ideals to the Moslem communities, too. It may or may not be effective, but one thing is certain: Failure to take this path will ultimately result in repression of the entire society by governments anxious to get a handle on rampant terrorism, and that will in turn eventuate in everyone losing the benefits of the civil liberties listed above.
© 2017 Michael L.S.
Showing posts with label civil liberties. Show all posts
Showing posts with label civil liberties. Show all posts
Friday, April 21, 2017
"No strategy" is not a strategy
Labels:
civil liberties,
extremism,
government,
Islam,
liberal,
libertarian,
terrorism
Thursday, December 3, 2015
Of Guns and Men
On the heels of the San Bernardino shooting perpetrated by two Moslem terrorists, tiresomely and predictably, President Obama and the chiefly liberal sections of the political establishment were on point railing against the supposedly too great availability of some or all types of weapons. Their trope is: Guns should be banned or restricted because, intuitively, fewer guns means fewer gun-related deaths.
In making such assertions, however, no hard data are ever adduced. Rather, they munificently deploy one emotionally-laden appeal after another, hoping to sway public opinion with sentiments that devolve to: "We must do something about it."
Following is just a selection of the factual arguments germane to the issue to be considered:
It is incontrovertible that, despite high-profile and widely-publicized incidents, the absolute and overwhelming majority of firearms in the United States are used legally, legitimately and responsibly, and that there is no scientifically-justified cause to believe that restricting or banning them would have the desired effect of significantly reducing gun-related violent crime.
The facts and figures above (all readily available and easily verifiable with simple Internet searches) cannot be rebutted by reiterating that, essentially, "guns are bad." Anti-gun advocates need to counter the foregoing data with data of their own, which are more scientific, more credible, more reliable, and more plausible. However, that is consistently and conspicuously not being done for the simple reason that such data do not exist. The said advocates, accordingly, fall back on the tactic of using interminable argumenta ad misericordia, false analogies, non-sequiturs, and other logical fallacies, i.e. they essay to impose what are mere personal prejudices and values on the rest.
That is anti-intellectual, anti-academic, and disingenuous.
It has also, thankfully, been ineffective in swaying public opinion.
Selected Bibliography (not formatted to standard):
©2015 Michael L.S.
In making such assertions, however, no hard data are ever adduced. Rather, they munificently deploy one emotionally-laden appeal after another, hoping to sway public opinion with sentiments that devolve to: "We must do something about it."
Following is just a selection of the factual arguments germane to the issue to be considered:
- Historically, the U.S. has been a "gun-toting" nation. Indeed, after the Second World War, the Korean War, the Viet Nam War, and others, America was awash with both weapons of every kind and with war veterans suffering from P.T.S.D. and many other mental ailments onset by the traumas they endured in the conflicts in which they fought. One would have expected those mentally-unstable people with ready access to destructive weaponry to have been shooting up America with terrifying frequency. Yet, prior to the 1980s there were only two mass shootings of note: A WW2 veteran killed 13 people in 1949 and a discharged Marine killed 16 people in 1966. Even in the 1980s there were still only a handful of such incidents. The prevalence of weapons and gun crime (especially high-profile, mass-casualty gun crime) clearly do not correlate historically.
- Case in point: Russia. The country has some of the most restrictive gun laws in the world where it is virtually impossible to obtain a gun. Fewer than nine out of 100 Russians possess a firearm. However, its overall homicide rate is almost four times that of the United States.
- By contrast, apart from having a lower homicide rate overall than Russia, despite there being 100 firearms per 100 population, only 10% of all violent crime in America involve firearms.
- The various recent trends in the United States also undermine the anti-gun narrative. The rate of gun ownership has been on a steady increase over the past two decades. Simultaneously, the homicide rate has been on a distinct downward course. (On a point of interest and without necessarily suggesting a causal relationship, home robberies have also been decreasing as gun ownership has been increasing.)
- Consider the following chart:
This chart is frequently employed by pro-gun advocates to argue that gun-"control" measures cause an increase in homicide, rather than a decline. That argument is a post hoc fallacy; much more additional study would be required to validate it. However, the chart does prove beyond a doubt that gun-"control" does NOT decrease homicides.
- Turning to history again, it demonstrates unequivocally that banning something deemed undesirable does not make it disappear. The examples are innumerable, and the range includes everything from alcohol and drugs, to pornography and homosexuality, to speeding and D.U.I. A ban on guns in Denmark, Belgium, and France very tragically did not prevent Moslem terrorists from massacring hundreds of people in cafes, trains, restaurants, and theaters there. Indeed, arguably, if even a fraction of the victims would have been armed, it is likely that the death toll in all such attacks would have been considerably lower. Likewise, astringent anti-gun laws in e.g. Chicago, Washington, and Detroit do not prevent those cities from having the highest gun-caused homicide rates in the nation.
- On the subject of D.U.I., more deaths are caused by intoxicated drivers than by guns. Yet, no proposal has been advanced to further restrict the availability of automobiles or driver's licenses or even to mandate installation of additional safety mechanisms. The reason why that should be so is self-evident: The overwhelming majority of drivers are law-abiding and responsible citizens. It would, therefore, be unconscionable to penalize them for the excesses of an exiguous and statistically-insignificant minority, notwithstanding the suffering the latter group causes.
- As far as safety, only 0.025% of the guns in circulation in the United States are utilized for illicit purposes. That is a safety record of 99.975%, which eclipses many common items in everyday use.
- Per 100,000 population, statistics show that such objects as swimming pools, scissors, stepladders, automobiles as well as many medical procedures are more lethal than guns. In other words, many--sometimes on the order of magnitude of several tenfold--more deaths are caused by the items aforesaid than by guns.
- The standard retort to the foregoing is that, unlike guns, those objects are "not designed to kill." That is correct; however, if the focus is on saving every precious life possible, then surely the most prolific provenances of death should be addressed in the order of priority.
- Another stock rejoinder is that people "do not need" firearms. Surely such advocates recognize that government apparatchiks deciding what people "need" and "do not need," particularly pursuant to their personal beliefs, is the very definition of totalitarianism, indeed, fascism.
- The overwhelming majority of firearms use and fatalities involve the criminal underworld (more than 80%). By its very definition, that milieu would not be affected by legislation restricting or banning guns.
- On a related note, far more crimes are prevented by the use of firearms than are committed. The most conservative ratio is 10,500 : 1. Recently, in Chicago--which, (in)famously has some of the harshest gun-phobic laws in the country--a conceal-carry citizen prevented a mass shooting.
- For years the pro-gun lobby's reflexive retort to attempts to institute gun-"control" has been to advert to the Second Amendment. For most of the time, the anti-gun campaigners ignored that point and deployed other arguments to support their position. As of recently, however, that has changed and it is now more common to witness rebuttals along the lines of: "The Second Amendment concerns the right of a militia to bear arms rather than ordinary citizens" and variations on the theme. Unfortunately for the proponents of that line, the U.S. Supreme Court already issued a crystal clear ruling on the matter (District of Columbia vs. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)), which affirms that the Second Amendment does apply to individual citizens outwith any reference to any militia (s. (1)(f)).
- A favorite anti-gun exponents' mantra--and one coopted by Pres. Obama himself--is that, if countries like Australia and England can "do it," then so can the United States. "Do it" is either left undefined altogether or its meaning is made suspiciously vague. The tenor behind such statements is that, basically, countries such as Great Britain and Australia banned gun ownership outright, and their rates of homicide are lower than America's, ergo... - it should be easy by now to fill in the rest. There are two major problems with this statement:
- England and Australia effected a complete ban of firearms. Unless mainstream politicians, including the President and highest-ranked lawmakers are lying, that is by no means the goal behind any gun-"control" initiative under even theoretical consideration.
- More importantly, statistics controvert the main premise of the argument, to wit, that the bans in the two countries had any salutary effect on their rates of homicide. Survey the following charts: It is obvious that, in both cases, anti-firearms measures did not entail a decrease in homicide. The same conclusion emerges from this, just as it does from every set of data: Banning guns does not reduce homicide.
- The moral of the story is that these highly selective attempts at comparison between the United States and a few carefully picked countries is an exercise in futility. A far more productive endeavor would be to cross-reference the rate of gun ownership with the rate of homicide, worldwide. The result of such a study is astounding: The United States is the undisputed leader as far as gun ownership (112.6 guns per 100 residents), leaving Serbia a distant second at under 70 guns per 100 residents. In terms of the intentional homicide rate, out of 218 states and territories, America is 121st. So 1st in gun-ownership, 121st in homicides: That does not sound like a country that has an intractable gun problem.
- On a final note, Switzerland has a high rate of gun ownership: little over a half of the U.S. However, there have been no mass-casualty firearm-related incidents in Switzerland. Conversely, Spain has a rate similar to Russia (i.e. less than 10% of that of the U.S.). Hypothetically, if the rate of gun ownership in Spain was similar to Switzerland's or America's, is it likely there would be mass shooting incidents there? While speculative, logic and extrapolation dictate that the answer be negative: The culture and nomos of Spain are different to that of America. The familial and societal structure are different, the values (such as individualism) are different, the quality and quantity of crime are different; all of those conspire to create an environment in which people simply do not act out in the way in which they act out in the United States. That involves not just mass shootings but many aspects of individual and collective behavior. Indeed, it answers the conundrum with which this piece opened: Why were there almost no mass shootings prior to the 1980s despite the prevalence of guns?
It is incontrovertible that, despite high-profile and widely-publicized incidents, the absolute and overwhelming majority of firearms in the United States are used legally, legitimately and responsibly, and that there is no scientifically-justified cause to believe that restricting or banning them would have the desired effect of significantly reducing gun-related violent crime.
The facts and figures above (all readily available and easily verifiable with simple Internet searches) cannot be rebutted by reiterating that, essentially, "guns are bad." Anti-gun advocates need to counter the foregoing data with data of their own, which are more scientific, more credible, more reliable, and more plausible. However, that is consistently and conspicuously not being done for the simple reason that such data do not exist. The said advocates, accordingly, fall back on the tactic of using interminable argumenta ad misericordia, false analogies, non-sequiturs, and other logical fallacies, i.e. they essay to impose what are mere personal prejudices and values on the rest.
That is anti-intellectual, anti-academic, and disingenuous.
It has also, thankfully, been ineffective in swaying public opinion.
Selected Bibliography (not formatted to standard):
- Crime and Guns (with a plethora of own references).
- Drunk Driving by the Numbers.
- Gun Homicide Rate Down 49% Since 1993 Peak; Public Unaware.
- Gun Rhetoric vs. Gun Facts.
- Kates, D.B., & Mauser, G. "Would Banning Firearms Reduce Murder and Suicide?" Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy. Vol. 30, No 2.
- Nine Myths Of Gun Control (also containing further references).
- Planty, M., & Truman, J. L. (2013). Firearm Violence, 1993-2011. Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
- The most common causes of death due to injury in the United States.
- The truth about gun deaths: Numbers and actual solutions.
- The U.S. Has More Guns, But Russia Has More Murders.
©2015 Michael L.S.
Labels:
2nd amendment,
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civil liberties,
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Monday, November 24, 2014
Plus ça change: Are human rights modern-day colonialism?
Reading through Anghie's (rather brief) exposition on some of the writings of Francisco de Vitoria--widely considered the pioneer of international law--one cannot but be struck by the parallels that can be drawn between his thinking more than five centuries ago and the doctrines informing some of the most recent of global developments.
When the Spanish encountered the "Indians" (Native Americans), they were unsure how to relate to them. A common error is made in this regard by believing that the former viewed the latter ex ante as less than human. That was not the case: De Vitoria and his contemporaries considered the natives fully human. They also acknowledged that they were "civilized," in that they had discernible values, systems of governance and societal order, capacity to interact with others, etc. The natives were, accordingly, fully human, equal in their humanity to the Spanish. However, the Spanish recognized that the natives' values system was at prodigious variance with their own, and the question ineluctably arose of how to reconcile them (if possible) or whose system would take precedence (if not).
De Vitoria astutely sidestepped the prevalent dogma at the time that all authority was ultimately traceable to a "god," or, more plausibly, the "god's" earthly representative (the pope). The reasoning was that the natives had never heard of Christianity and could hence not be held liable under its injunctions. He thus fell back on the (Aquinian) notion of natural law, i.e. an objective, ubiquitous set of rules and values immanent in all human beings. De Vitoria termed its contemporary incarnation as ius gentium. Here was the rub: He posited that, whereas ius gentium was universal, the Spanish had, in a manner of speaking, "perfected" it. By implication, the natives required assistance to self-realize the truism, benefits, and execution of ius gentium, and it was the Spaniards' duty to proffer that guidance and help. Crucially, any opposition was deemed unreasonable: If the norms of ius gentium were the perfection of thought and practice for all humankind, then any opposition to it was a fortiori retrograde, reactionary, and progress-retarding, and, accordingly, had to be staunched... - by any means necessary. On that view, by extirpating dissent to the process of inculcation of ius gentium among the natives, the Spanish were doing them a major favor (even if that "favor" ended up manifesting itself in the form of blatant theft and ruthless genocide).
The analogy with modern times is glaring. What was ius gentium in the days of de Vitoria is the conceptualization of putatively "universal" human rights (liberal democratic governance, rule of law, separation of powers, equality of the sexes, various freedoms (thought speech, etc.), protection of minorities, and so forth) today. These values--just as ius gentium of old--are a product of evolution of the Western thought, and have been institutionalized by means of international organizations (e.g. the U.N.), which, themselves, are a product of Western politics.
The U.N. has promulgated such values through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants, and other instruments. The Europeans states have embraced even higher normative standards in the form of the E.U.'s Charter of Fundamental Rights and the E.C.H.R. The O.A.S. has its own charter as does the A.U. A.S.E.A.N. and the Arab League also compiled declarations, though these have been rebuked for falling short of the "universal" values.
The question is what happens when a subject deviates from these "universal" norms. That can be due to e.g. its cultural specificities or economic particularities. The Arab Charter on Human Rights, for instance, fails to guarantee equal treatment of women and discriminates against non-citizens' basic rights. A.S.E.A.N.'s attempt has met with even more strident criticism for omitting some of the most longstanding, fundamental protections or providing conspicuous and numerous loopholes to evade them. These, however, are difficult to challenge directly, being that they are endorsed by a multiplicity of quite powerful states. There is an entire official (government) and semi-official (N.G.O.s) "industry" centered around producing reports and conducting campaigns concerning individual states' adherence to the human right principles. Which principles? The "universal" ones, but of course. And where the presumptive "international society" (read: the Western-led international organizations) can, it does its utmost to introduce as many of these norms as possible to the areas under its control (e.g. Timor-Leste, Kosovo, Iraq, etc.). Harking back to de Vitoria, opposition to such endeavors is excoriated as backward, unhelpful, and, yes, hostile. Though such hostility is no longer countered with genocide, its protagonists are excluded from all nation-building processes and, depending on the extent and quality of their opposition, may be subjected to anything from imprisonment to "daisy-cutters."
The issue at the heart of this discourse is what the A.S.E.A.N. Declaration unabashedly makes reference to: the notion of "cultural relativism." It is an idea with which even a cursory observer of current affairs is familiar, to wit, that every society has a right (indeed, a human right!) to practice and safeguard the values prevailing in that society, even if these diverge considerably from the alleged "universal" values. That idea is espoused by such diverse actors as autocratic regimes, leftist academics, Western leaders (still reeling under the burden of colonial baggage), and, indeed, a great many people in the type of societies in the docket, including those (e.g. women) who would benefit from a conferral of the "universal" rights on them. Who, the trope goes, made those rights "universal" and with what justification? What should give the (Western or West-tainted) powers the right to, yet again, impose their views on the sovereign peoples of the world? Did we learn nothing from the brutalities of centuries of colonialist practice?
The opposing view is that of the "soft bigotry" of lowered expectations. The contention here is that the "universal" values are indeed superior to--termed, for simplicity's sake--regional values, and that attempting to equalize the worthiness and merit of the two bespeaks racism, for it implies that the "regionals" are not deserving of enjoying the same liberties and rights as those fortunate enough to be living in, basically, the Western(-modeled) countries. Far from striving to eschew the aggregate of the colonialist enterprise, "cultural relativism" does the opposite: It perpetuates the "natives'" inferiority.
The crux of the matter, therefore, is the status of the "universal" set of human rights norms in comparison to the others. Is it--its misnomer notwithstanding--just one of many acceptable (which itself is a normative term) standards or is it the ideal toward whose truly universal implementation to aim?
Descrying a definitive answer to this is impossible. The Western body politic is petrified of doing or saying anything remotely reminiscent of colonial practices (further affected by the anomie plaguing its society, in which any kind of judgment is unwelcome). The assorted Third World tyrants are keen to maintain the status quo, which is greatly strengthened by illiberal practices passed off as "local culture." Many ordinary people in those societies, too, vehemently oppose change. (That is by no means unprecedented: Some of the most ornery opponents of the Suffragette movement in the West were precisely women. For instance, tales abound of female prison wardens being far more brutal toward incarcerated women's rights activists than their male counterparts. Scores of women, too, made public speeches and engaged in other types of campaign denouncing the Suffragettes.) Who is entitled to deem one system of values better or worse than others, on what basis, and pursuant to what criteria?
Meanwhile, child marriages are rampant. So is marital rape. Cheap child labor supports entire economies. Homosexuals are hanged, "apostates" beheaded, "adulterers" stoned, juveniles imprisoned with adults, "blasphemers" lynched, girls denied access to basic education. The Gulf Cooperation Council states openly practice what can only be described as modern-day slavery. Tens of thousands of people are locked up without any due process, including for political slights and "thoughtcrime." Tens of millions have no recourse to justice against gross excesses by state power. Hundreds of millions are unable to have any input on who determines the course of their lives. Do those individuals not deserve the quality of life that those born in other places in the world are fortunate enough to be able to take for granted? Should those so blessed not assay to help the them?
If the latter narrative is embraced, there will inevitably arise resistance, including from among the "natives." How should it be addressed: the way of the Spanish or differently? Is a universalization of human rights necessarily a zero-sum endeavor, viz, either the current state of affairs is accepted or the errant societies are brought into line, even manu militari if need be?
Might the answer lie in gradual, nuanced--yet insistently, doggedly, confidently, continually driven--change employing methods such as Joseph Nye's "soft power"? That could take generations, meanwhile condemning billions to continued suffering and inferior life quality. Conversely, rapid, revolutionary tactics could backfire (q.v. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and other, less pronounced, cases in Africa), occasioning conflict whose immediate ramifications would be far more detrimental than the invidious conditions at present.
One conclusion does seem inevitable: The "universal" norms of human rights are superior and should be adopted and practiced globally. How that is actualized is a different matter, but de Vitoria's strategy is not an option.
© 2014 Michael L.S.
When the Spanish encountered the "Indians" (Native Americans), they were unsure how to relate to them. A common error is made in this regard by believing that the former viewed the latter ex ante as less than human. That was not the case: De Vitoria and his contemporaries considered the natives fully human. They also acknowledged that they were "civilized," in that they had discernible values, systems of governance and societal order, capacity to interact with others, etc. The natives were, accordingly, fully human, equal in their humanity to the Spanish. However, the Spanish recognized that the natives' values system was at prodigious variance with their own, and the question ineluctably arose of how to reconcile them (if possible) or whose system would take precedence (if not).
De Vitoria astutely sidestepped the prevalent dogma at the time that all authority was ultimately traceable to a "god," or, more plausibly, the "god's" earthly representative (the pope). The reasoning was that the natives had never heard of Christianity and could hence not be held liable under its injunctions. He thus fell back on the (Aquinian) notion of natural law, i.e. an objective, ubiquitous set of rules and values immanent in all human beings. De Vitoria termed its contemporary incarnation as ius gentium. Here was the rub: He posited that, whereas ius gentium was universal, the Spanish had, in a manner of speaking, "perfected" it. By implication, the natives required assistance to self-realize the truism, benefits, and execution of ius gentium, and it was the Spaniards' duty to proffer that guidance and help. Crucially, any opposition was deemed unreasonable: If the norms of ius gentium were the perfection of thought and practice for all humankind, then any opposition to it was a fortiori retrograde, reactionary, and progress-retarding, and, accordingly, had to be staunched... - by any means necessary. On that view, by extirpating dissent to the process of inculcation of ius gentium among the natives, the Spanish were doing them a major favor (even if that "favor" ended up manifesting itself in the form of blatant theft and ruthless genocide).
The analogy with modern times is glaring. What was ius gentium in the days of de Vitoria is the conceptualization of putatively "universal" human rights (liberal democratic governance, rule of law, separation of powers, equality of the sexes, various freedoms (thought speech, etc.), protection of minorities, and so forth) today. These values--just as ius gentium of old--are a product of evolution of the Western thought, and have been institutionalized by means of international organizations (e.g. the U.N.), which, themselves, are a product of Western politics.
The U.N. has promulgated such values through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants, and other instruments. The Europeans states have embraced even higher normative standards in the form of the E.U.'s Charter of Fundamental Rights and the E.C.H.R. The O.A.S. has its own charter as does the A.U. A.S.E.A.N. and the Arab League also compiled declarations, though these have been rebuked for falling short of the "universal" values.
The question is what happens when a subject deviates from these "universal" norms. That can be due to e.g. its cultural specificities or economic particularities. The Arab Charter on Human Rights, for instance, fails to guarantee equal treatment of women and discriminates against non-citizens' basic rights. A.S.E.A.N.'s attempt has met with even more strident criticism for omitting some of the most longstanding, fundamental protections or providing conspicuous and numerous loopholes to evade them. These, however, are difficult to challenge directly, being that they are endorsed by a multiplicity of quite powerful states. There is an entire official (government) and semi-official (N.G.O.s) "industry" centered around producing reports and conducting campaigns concerning individual states' adherence to the human right principles. Which principles? The "universal" ones, but of course. And where the presumptive "international society" (read: the Western-led international organizations) can, it does its utmost to introduce as many of these norms as possible to the areas under its control (e.g. Timor-Leste, Kosovo, Iraq, etc.). Harking back to de Vitoria, opposition to such endeavors is excoriated as backward, unhelpful, and, yes, hostile. Though such hostility is no longer countered with genocide, its protagonists are excluded from all nation-building processes and, depending on the extent and quality of their opposition, may be subjected to anything from imprisonment to "daisy-cutters."
The issue at the heart of this discourse is what the A.S.E.A.N. Declaration unabashedly makes reference to: the notion of "cultural relativism." It is an idea with which even a cursory observer of current affairs is familiar, to wit, that every society has a right (indeed, a human right!) to practice and safeguard the values prevailing in that society, even if these diverge considerably from the alleged "universal" values. That idea is espoused by such diverse actors as autocratic regimes, leftist academics, Western leaders (still reeling under the burden of colonial baggage), and, indeed, a great many people in the type of societies in the docket, including those (e.g. women) who would benefit from a conferral of the "universal" rights on them. Who, the trope goes, made those rights "universal" and with what justification? What should give the (Western or West-tainted) powers the right to, yet again, impose their views on the sovereign peoples of the world? Did we learn nothing from the brutalities of centuries of colonialist practice?
The opposing view is that of the "soft bigotry" of lowered expectations. The contention here is that the "universal" values are indeed superior to--termed, for simplicity's sake--regional values, and that attempting to equalize the worthiness and merit of the two bespeaks racism, for it implies that the "regionals" are not deserving of enjoying the same liberties and rights as those fortunate enough to be living in, basically, the Western(-modeled) countries. Far from striving to eschew the aggregate of the colonialist enterprise, "cultural relativism" does the opposite: It perpetuates the "natives'" inferiority.
The crux of the matter, therefore, is the status of the "universal" set of human rights norms in comparison to the others. Is it--its misnomer notwithstanding--just one of many acceptable (which itself is a normative term) standards or is it the ideal toward whose truly universal implementation to aim?
Descrying a definitive answer to this is impossible. The Western body politic is petrified of doing or saying anything remotely reminiscent of colonial practices (further affected by the anomie plaguing its society, in which any kind of judgment is unwelcome). The assorted Third World tyrants are keen to maintain the status quo, which is greatly strengthened by illiberal practices passed off as "local culture." Many ordinary people in those societies, too, vehemently oppose change. (That is by no means unprecedented: Some of the most ornery opponents of the Suffragette movement in the West were precisely women. For instance, tales abound of female prison wardens being far more brutal toward incarcerated women's rights activists than their male counterparts. Scores of women, too, made public speeches and engaged in other types of campaign denouncing the Suffragettes.) Who is entitled to deem one system of values better or worse than others, on what basis, and pursuant to what criteria?
Meanwhile, child marriages are rampant. So is marital rape. Cheap child labor supports entire economies. Homosexuals are hanged, "apostates" beheaded, "adulterers" stoned, juveniles imprisoned with adults, "blasphemers" lynched, girls denied access to basic education. The Gulf Cooperation Council states openly practice what can only be described as modern-day slavery. Tens of thousands of people are locked up without any due process, including for political slights and "thoughtcrime." Tens of millions have no recourse to justice against gross excesses by state power. Hundreds of millions are unable to have any input on who determines the course of their lives. Do those individuals not deserve the quality of life that those born in other places in the world are fortunate enough to be able to take for granted? Should those so blessed not assay to help the them?
If the latter narrative is embraced, there will inevitably arise resistance, including from among the "natives." How should it be addressed: the way of the Spanish or differently? Is a universalization of human rights necessarily a zero-sum endeavor, viz, either the current state of affairs is accepted or the errant societies are brought into line, even manu militari if need be?
Might the answer lie in gradual, nuanced--yet insistently, doggedly, confidently, continually driven--change employing methods such as Joseph Nye's "soft power"? That could take generations, meanwhile condemning billions to continued suffering and inferior life quality. Conversely, rapid, revolutionary tactics could backfire (q.v. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and other, less pronounced, cases in Africa), occasioning conflict whose immediate ramifications would be far more detrimental than the invidious conditions at present.
One conclusion does seem inevitable: The "universal" norms of human rights are superior and should be adopted and practiced globally. How that is actualized is a different matter, but de Vitoria's strategy is not an option.
© 2014 Michael L.S.
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